The issue of fate and free will, debated by Islamic scholars for over a thousand years, is now one of the most challenging questions in modern physics.
A video published on BBC Reel reminds us that modern physics is bringing an ancient question back to the forefront: Does free will truly exist, or are human decisions, like other events in the universe, part of a predetermined cause-and-effect chain? The video questions the relationship between natural laws, causality, and human behavior, noting that some physicists may view free will as an illusion. While this question may seem to belong to modern science at first glance, it is actually a re-asking, in a different language, of the issue of fate, determinism, and human responsibility that has been debated for centuries in the Islamic intellectual tradition. The BBC video frames this debate as “physics pointing to the absence of free will” (https://www.bbc.com/reel/video/p086tg3k/watch).
In modern philosophy, “determinism” roughly holds that if the past state and the laws of nature are the same, the future will necessarily unfold in the same way. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines determinism as the emergence of the same future under the same past and the same laws of nature. If this approach is correct, the question of whether humans can “act differently” becomes a serious problem. Because a person’s decision ultimately seems to depend on brain processes, biological structures, environmental influences, and physical laws (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/).
This debate is not only theoretical. The issue of free will is directly linked to moral responsibility. If humans truly cannot choose, how can we speak of good and evil, crime and virtue, courage and betrayal, supporting or resisting oppression? Therefore, the relationship between free will, moral responsibility, and determinism is considered one of the most controversial areas in philosophical literature. Some philosophers argue that even if determinism is true, moral responsibility does not disappear entirely; This approach is known as “compatibilism” (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/).
In Islamic thought, the same question has been asked with different concepts: Is man truly free in his actions, or is he completely compelled by God’s decree? This question has been answered in different ways across the history of Kalam, including Jabriyya, Qadariyyah/Mu’tazilite, Ash’ari, Maturidi, and Shi’ite Kalam.
The Jabriyya approach emphasizes that man is not truly free in his actions. According to this view, man is not the independent agent of his own actions; actions ultimately occur under the absolute will and power of God. There is a striking similarity between strict determinism in modern physics and Jabriyya in this respect. One considers the universe through the laws of nature, the other through divine will, but both question whether man has a “completely free starting point.”
At the opposite end of the spectrum from the Jabriyyah are the Qadariyyah and the Mu’tazilite school of thought. Britannica defines the Qadariyyah as proponents of the doctrine of free will in Islam, noting that this name is also used for the Mu’tazilite, who argue that humans can choose between good and evil through their own free will. The Mu’tazilites’ fundamental concern is God’s justice: If humans are punished for actions they did not choose, how is this compatible with divine justice? Therefore, the Mu’tazilites create a strong space for free will to protect human moral responsibility (https://www.britannica.com/topic/Qadariyyah).
The Ahl al-Sunnah tradition, on the other hand, has generally sought a balance between the two extremes. In the Ash’ari approach, God is the creator of the action; humans “acquire” the action, that is, they adopt and possess it through their will. This approach, while striving to preserve God’s absolute power, does not completely reject human responsibility. However, throughout history, some commentators have believed that the Ash’ari tradition left a limited scope for human free will.
The Maturidi tradition, on the other hand, stands out for granting a more distinct scope for human free will. Britannica notes that while Maturidism emphasizes God’s absolute power, it also grants humans a minimum degree of freedom to justly reward or punish them. In this approach, God’s knowledge does not mean coercion. That is, God knows what humans will choose, but knowing and coercion are not the same thing (https://www.britannica.com/topic/Maturidiyah).
A similar middle-ground formula has been developed in Shi’ite theology: “Neither coercion nor complete impunity; a middle path between the two.” This approach neither views humans as an absolute agent independent of God nor reduces them to a completely passive being. In this respect, there is a common sensitivity in the main currents of Islamic thought: while preserving God’s knowledge and power, efforts are made to ensure that human moral responsibility is not rendered meaningless.
The modern physics debate finds an interesting point of contact with Islamic theology here. Physics asks, “If every event has a physical cause, how free is human decision-making?” Theology, on the other hand, asks, “If everything is within God’s knowledge and decree, how responsible is man?” One thinks through the laws of nature, the other through divine knowledge and will. But at the heart of both lies the same tension: How can determinism and responsibility be considered together?
Of course, modern physics has not definitively proven that free will is impossible. Current discussions, such as chaos theory, quantum uncertainty, and the emergence of consciousness in complex systems, make it difficult to maintain a rigid, simplistic understanding of determinism. For example, a recent assessment published on Space.com emphasizes that physics seriously challenges free will, but topics like chaos, quantum mechanics, and “emergence” do not close the matter; on the contrary, they make it more complex (https://www.space.com/science/particle-physics/does-physics-say-that-free-will-doesnt-exist).
At this point, Islamic scholars and physicists have much to learn from each other. Physicists can benefit from the delicate balance that Islamic theology has sought to strike for centuries between fate, divine knowledge, human free will, and moral responsibility. Islamic thinkers, in turn, can benefit from the new horizons opened by modern physics regarding causality, uncertainty, complexity, and consciousness. Such an encounter does not mean reducing science to religion or making religion an endorsement of physics. More accurately, it means that humanity’s great questions reappear in different languages within different intellectual traditions.
This discussion is particularly significant for academic freedom. Because the issue of free will and fate is not merely a theoretical problem, it is also important for understanding human responsibility during periods of oppression. Authoritarian regimes often drive people to feel, “I had no other choice.” Bureaucrats, academics, judges, journalists, or doctors sometimes explain their silence by circumstances, by fear, or by fate. Phrases like “That’s just how things were at the time,” “Everyone did it that way,” and “There was nothing I could do,” are like the secular determinism of modern times…
However, both our moral intuition and the main current of Islamic thought tell us this: Man is not entirely outside of circumstances, but neither is he entirely a prisoner of them. Family, society, fear, self-interest, biology, politics, and pressure influence human decisions. But being under the influence does not mean responsibility disappears entirely. Sometimes, even if it’s within a narrow scope, sometimes at great cost, sometimes in solitude, man is forced to make a choice. It is in this realm of choice that moral identity is shaped.
In the same oppressive environment, we see some academics remaining silent, some aligning themselves with power, some legitimizing injustice, and others standing by the truth by paying the price. Understanding this difference requires neither simple fatalism nor viewing man as an absolutely free being independent of all circumstances.
Ultimately, modern physics and Islamic theology discuss the same question in different languages: Does man truly choose? The answer to this question is not easy. However, it is possible to say this much: Will may not be limitless; humans make decisions under the influence of many visible and invisible factors. But limited will does not mean irresponsibility. Humans are beings capable of directing themselves towards truth, justice, and conscience within the limited scope of possibilities given to them. A person’s value lies in the choices they make within this narrow scope.
